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New Policies and New Goals
for Changing Times
The European economy was one of the great postwar success stories.
Today the eastward-expanding European Union will become the world’s
largest economic region. More countries would like to join the European
Union and emulate the current member states—not surprising since most
Western Europeans today are living comfortably and are protected from
economic losses. Yet today’s affluent European economies face serious
challenges if they are to maintain their current standard of living, while
the newly entering countries of Eastern Europe will be able to catch up
economically only if they avoid the growth-limiting policies that exist in
some of the Western European economies. Transforming the European
economy is a necessity. Preparing it for the challenges of the 21st century
will require painful adjustments; many existing companies will fail, and
many workers will lose their jobs. 
Not surprisingly, there is great political resistance to serious reform ef-
forts. Yet a transformation of the European economy—indeed a radical
transformation—is exactly what European leaders agreed was needed at
a meeting in 2000 in Lisbon. The leaders reiterated their commitment to
the Lisbon goals at the March 2004 EU Council meeting in Brussels. The
time has come to actually implement the reforms and achieve those goals.
As the Council itself stated in March: “The challenge now is follow-up:
Recognize that things change and that we need to change with them, so the mere
fact that a set of practices has been successful or comfortable in the past is not an
argument for its maintenance into the future.
—Bradford DeLong1
1. One of five lessons learned from David Landes’ The Wealth and Poverty of Nations; see
www.j-bradford-delong.net.
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ing year.”
A positive message that performance in Europe can be improved—sub-
stantially so—can drive economic reform in Europe. Europe can create an
economy that combines both strong growth and a solid social safety net,
though it will not be easy. Indeed, many sacred cows of social policy, labor-
market policy, and product-market regulation will have to be slaughtered
along the way. These changes will not be costless. But the promise of bet-
ter performance does not have to be taken on faith. There are several ex-
amples within Europe of reforms that have already worked. Denmark, the
Netherlands, and Sweden have made labor-market reforms that raised
employment and lowered unemployment. Britain, France, and Germany
all have industries that were privatized or deregulated and where produc-
tivity increased rapidly.
Positive messages are more appealing than negative ones, but economic
reform in Europe also has to be driven by a stick. When the going gets
tough on reform and protests abound, it is important to remember that
Europe cannot simply maintain the status quo. To do so would mortgage
the future of younger Europeans, who would pay the price of present-day
political inaction. But even apart from the issue of generational equity, the
current system is not sustainable. The days when workers stayed in the
same job or with the same firm until retirement (which might begin at age
55) have gone. The world today is radically different from the postwar pe-
riod, when the cornerstones of Europe’s present economic and social in-
stitutions were laid. It is not just the impact of technology. It is not just the
impact of trade, globalization, and the new countries entering the Euro-
pean Union. It is not just shifts in consumer tastes or in demographics.
Rather, it is the combination of all of these. These forces inevitably will af-
fect Europe—indeed, they have already. Europe must not only respond
positively to future forces of change, but also reverse some of the adverse
trends that started in the 1970s.
The book’s purpose is twofold. First, it presents an analysis of economic
performance in Britain, France, Germany, and—to a lesser extent—Italy.
We examine how these large European economies reached their current
situations and the challenges they face going forward. In addition, the
book reviews labor-market developments in Denmark, the Netherlands,
and Sweden to evaluate the success of their reform efforts and see what
lessons they can provide to the efforts now under way in France and Ger-
many.2 The book also analyzes the policies of the European Central Bank
(ECB) and the impact of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), and offers
recommendations for their continued role in solving the economic chal-
lenges facing the region.
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2. Britain’s economic situation is somewhat different, while Italy has not yet undertaken a
major social reform effort.
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that—if adopted—would increase the core European economies’ rates of
productivity growth and job creation. Improved performance in these
areas is the key to improving living standards, meeting the future demo-
graphic challenge of the retiring baby boom generation, and—crucially—
mitigating the social exclusion that occurs with persistently high levels of
unemployment and underemployment.
The most important theme of this book is that workers, companies, and policy-
makers must be able to adapt to change. This idea has not been accepted on
either side of the Atlantic and fighting against it causes many economic
battles and policy distortions.3 As important as it is to enact new reform
policies in Europe, it is even more important to alter workers’ view of the
economy and to articulate their role in its—and consequently their own—
prosperity.
Structurally, the book sets out the factual analysis first and follows up
with policy recommendations. However, this first chapter jumps the gun
by providing an overview of the main policy proposals. The reason for
this is obvious, but there are two dangers involved. The first danger is that
the policy proposals and the priorities placed on them as presented will
stand alone since the later chapters provide analysis and support. We
ameliorate this problem by giving summaries of why the proposed poli-
cies are important. 
The second danger occurs because many of the specific reforms pro-
posed are designed to improve the economic incentives facing individu-
als and companies—we are suggesting market-oriented reforms. Since a
main purpose of this book is to contribute to the policy debate in Europe,
it would be unfortunate if its findings were dismissed because of a be-
lief that they simply suggest that Europe become more like the United
States. We fully understand the antipathy of Europeans toward self-
congratulatory US commentators who preach the virtues of the free mar-
ket while conveniently ignoring the serious economic problems facing
their own country—some of which stem from US policies not following
good market principles. While economic and policy problems in the
United States are not addressed in this book, we are well aware of them.
At the same time, we are also impatient with European commentators
who argue that the region does not face serious economic problems and
therefore existing policies are adequate and major new reforms are un-
necessary. We also disagree with a variation on this theme that says that
Germany is the only economy in Europe with problems. The European
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3. The 2004 US presidential campaign is influenced by fears of offshoring US jobs. In Ger-
many, Chancellor Schröder has described any company that moves jobs offshore as unpa-
triotic, which is something of an irony since the country has run a large trade surplus for
years. Many German jobs depend upon the willingness of other countries to offshore their
jobs.
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mies are performing very well. However,  a number of European econo-
mies—notably the four largest—clearly need to sustain existing reforms
and enact additional economic reforms.
The title of this book, Transforming the European Economy, is actually a
modification of a landmark statement made at the 2000 Lisbon Council
meeting where European leaders called for a “radical transformation of
the European economy.” They also argued that “an average economic
growth rate of around 3 percent should be a realistic prospect for the com-
ing years. . . .” Subsequent meetings set ambitious targets for increasing
employment: Over 20 million jobs would be created in the European
Union by 2010.4 However, these goals should be reached while preserv-
ing an effective social safety net and sustaining the region’s environment
and historical legacy.
The reform proposals in this book are intended to help national policy-
makers and EU-level policymakers figure out how to reach the goals they
have set for themselves.
The Need for Sustained Economic Reform in Europe
For most of the postwar period, Europe outpaced the United States and
caught up to the US level of labor productivity (output per hour worked).
After experiencing an economic slowdown in 2002–03, Europe is expected
to make at least a modest recovery in 2004.5 But reform is needed if
Europe is to return to full employment and to achieve its maximum
growth rate, given the pace of worldwide advances in technology and
business practices. European policymakers should use neither concerns
about social inclusion nor the environment as an excuse for inaction. Fur-
thermore, they should not protect special interests at the expense of those
who could be employed in a more flexible economy. Welfare systems and
labor laws must provide the right incentives to Europeans to participate
in the economy and not divide the population into two groups: the well-
protected insiders who have jobs and an unsustainably large number of
outsiders who do not.
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4. See Presidency Conclusions, Lisbon European Council, March 23–24, 2000, http://ue.eu.
int/Newsroom/LoadDoc.asp?BID=76&DID=60917&from=&LANG=1. See also European
Commission (2002e, 1–3). Many additional targets for specific policy areas have since been
set at the biannual European Council Summits. For an overview, see the European Com-
mission’s Lisbon Agenda Web site, www.europa.eu.int/comm/lisbon_strategy/index_en.
html.
5. Although Europe did not experience the same level of job loss after 2000 that occurred in
the United States, the region did suffer a significant slowdown. Hours worked per capita are
down in all the major economies. To the extent that the number of jobs has increased, this is
mostly from part-time work or increased job sharing.
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pean economies, with unemployment around 10 percent as of mid-2004.
Real GDP growth in Germany was only 1.4 percent a year over the 1993 to
2003 period. The German economy has gone from being the leader and
driver of European growth to its laggard. France’s real GDP growth was
somewhat faster than Germany’s at 2 percent a year over the same period,
but its unemployment rate was also around 10 percent in 2004. In fact, un-
employment in France has been chronically high for decades. Italy, at 1.5
percent per year, saw growth almost as low as Germany’s from 1993 to
2003 and continues to face arguably the worst demographics of any Euro-
pean country—an unemployment rate close to 10 percent and a govern-
ment debt to GDP ratio of more than 100 percent. In contrast, Britain’s
GDP growth was pretty strong from 1993 to 2003, at 2.8 percent a year, and
its unemployment rate is around 5 percent. However, this follows many
years of very poor performance, and even today, Britain’s level of produc-
tivity is well below that of the other large European economies and of the
United States and shows little sign so far of closing the gap. Despite their
differences, Britain, France, Germany, and Italy all have GDP per capita of
about the same level, equal to roughly three-quarters of the US figure.
On the productivity issue specifically, it seems that productivity growth
has slowed in the large European economies in recent years.6 This is in
contrast not only to the United States, but also to Australia and some of
the smaller European economies. If the large European economies could
increase their rate of productivity growth they could raise their living
standards, lower unemployment, and go part way toward meeting the
needs of the retiring baby boomers. Thus, the goal for Europe is to combine
high and rising productivity with full employment.
Europeans who resist economic reform argue that they are quite willing
to trade off higher incomes for greater social equity, but this argument does
not justify resistance to reform. First, providing greater employment op-
portunities is a vital part of an egalitarian society. Second, Europe could
achieve many of the same social goals while improving economic in-
centives and economic performance. Social insurance in Europe could be
redesigned to cause fewer perverse incentives for a given level of social
protection. The current system in major European countries is fatal for em-
ployment. Wage rates for low-skilled workers are inflexible. Payroll taxes
are very high and inflate company employment costs (along with other
employer mandates). Benefit levels paid to the unemployed and to many
others on a variety of social welfare programs are kept high relative to
after-tax wages and are paid for prolonged periods. This system discour-
ages employers from hiring and workers from taking jobs.
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6. Germany is a special case because of reunification. Reunification caused a large one-time
drop in average productivity as East Germany was absorbed into the total. Then growth was
boosted as East Germany was modernized. We discuss Germany further in chapter 2.
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suggests. Europe does not have the luxury of running in place. Inextrica-
bly linked to the global economy, Europe is facing large new challenges as
rapid technological change continues, countries such as China and India
emerge as new competitors in the world market, and Eastern European
nations enter the union. We have already mentioned the impending in-
ternal challenge from the large aging population.
Europe’s economic performance has deteriorated over time because the
institutions and policies that were effective in the postwar period of re-
building and catch-up have become increasingly dysfunctional. The key to
economic growth in high-income economies is adaptability and flexibility.
Only flexible economies are able to adapt to internal shifts, global devel-
opments from beyond their borders, and new technological advances,
while generating productivity growth and the new jobs required to achieve
true social cohesion.
Reform Progress to Date
Europe’s political leaders not only embraced reform in Lisbon in 2000,
they have also undertaken specific reform policies, a number of which are
important moves in the right direction. Overall progress on reaching the
Lisbon goals, however, has been limited. In its own recent review, the Eu-
ropean Commission (2004c, 2) noted the following: “Indeed, in certain do-
mains there are significant problems which hold back the entire strategy
and which hinder the return of strong growth. What is more, the most im-
portant delays have been identified in three strategic domains, which are
crucial for growth: knowledge and networks, industrial and service sec-
tor competitiveness, and active ageing.”
Following the Council meeting in Brussels in March 2004 the leaders
issued a statement that acknowledged the validity of the Commission’s
concerns about the reform agenda’s slow progress. However, one of their
proposed solutions was to convene yet another study of the situation—a
very weak response.
This is particularly frustrating since the European Commission report
also highlights the diversity within Europe. Some member states have al-
ready achieved many of the 2010 goals, while others have barely begun.7
“Catch-up” economies, such as Ireland and Spain, have achieved very
rapid growth. Some of the smaller European countries, such as the Nether-
lands, Denmark, and Sweden, have performed well in recent years, even
though they were already above the European income average. These three
countries have achieved high employment rates and high degrees of social
6 TRANSFORMING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMY
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already in place. As we will show, much progress would be achieved if Eu-
ropean countries would learn from each other’s policy successes. After all,
European solutions have already been found to many of Europe’s problems.
A Framework for Transforming the European Economy
This section summarizes the specific reform measures that we believe
would be most effective in improving employment and productivity
growth in Europe—the top priorities for reform. We then point to some
policy reforms that have been proposed but in our view are less important
or in some cases even counterproductive. One of the common miscon-
ceptions in Europe—particularly in Germany—is that the labor market is
the only problem. We find that both product- and labor-market reforms
are important. We start by highlighting the top three policies to improve
productivity and the top three policies to improve labor-market perfor-
mance, before going into the complete reform framework. 
Top Three Policy Priorities for Productivity. First, reform land use poli-
cies to give decision makers greater incentives to favor economic devel-
opment. Second, because European manufacturing is not fully open 
to global competition, the remaining trade barriers must be eliminated.
Third, complete the task of service-sector liberalization and privatization
that has already yielded substantial successes.
Top Three Policy Priorities for Increasing Employment. First, sharply
reduce the legal and financial barriers that prevent companies from re-
structuring and discourage new hiring. Second, reform social welfare poli-
cies by encouraging people to work instead of encouraging them not to
work. Cut back automatic benefits, and either start a wage insurance pro-
gram or institute the close monitoring of individual social benefit recipi-
ents (as occurs in Denmark). Third, facilitate a widening of the distribu-
tion of wages paid by employers while preserving social equity through
other polices.
Policies to Improve Productivity 
To achieve better productivity performance, the level of competitive in-
tensity must be increased. This involves greater openness to global com-
petition, domestic (country-by-country) regulatory reform, and complet-
ing the process of privatization and liberalization.
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with the goals of increasing competitive intensity and removing barriers
to productivity increase. Regulation is a fact of life, whether it involves en-
suring transparency to protect the interests of shareholders, or whether it
involves implementing health and safety regulation to protect workers and
consumers, or whether it involves using a central bank to protect the
financial system. However, regulation has become counterproductive in
Europe, because it has been taken over by vested interests—regulatory cap-
ture. It is not possible here to examine each industry in each country and
list all the specific regulations that are hurting productivity. But five exam-
ples are provided to illustrate different facets of the regulatory problem and
the ways in which regulatory reform should be undertaken. Independent
competition agencies in each country (like Britain’s Office of Fair Trading)
should be charged with identifying barriers in all industries. This is not cur-
rently part of the mandate of the EU competition authority, nor should it
be. Since competitive problems inevitably will be country-specific, such as-
sessments are best carried out at the member-state level.
  Land use policies must be reformed. Economies cannot change and re-
structure unless there is flexibility of land use. Restrictive land use
policies have discouraged new competitors from entering local mar-
kets in retailing, housing construction, hotels, and other industries.
These restrictive land use policies thus discourage new companies
and new job creation. Zoning is important and can be used appropri-
ately to preserve historical values and the environment. In practice,
however, zoning authorities have been captured by local interests, and
zoning regulations have been used to protect incumbent companies.
Zoning laws and the authorities that enforce them should be reformed
so that incentives are better balanced—for example, by ensuring that
local entities deciding zoning issues benefit from the new business
taxes. The economic development benefits to the society as a whole
must weigh more heavily in land use decisions, and these benefits
should be reflected in the incentives faced by decision makers.
  European governments should end the practice of using overt or implicit sub-
sidies to keep low-productivity incumbents operating. In Britain, despite
then–Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s free-market rhetoric, large
subsidies were paid to sustain low-productivity auto plants. The
French government routinely provides financial support to failing
companies. In Germany, subsidized funding is provided to many in-
dustries, especially manufacturing, construction, and coal. Although
EU regulations ostensibly ended these subsidies, they continue. Al-
lowing companies to fail is an important part of encouraging economies
to succeed.
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velop European champions (related to previous point). The proposed
policies are unnecessary because multinational companies headquar-
tered in Europe are already doing well in the global economy. Miche-
lin, Royal Dutch/Shell Group, Olivetti Tecnost SpA, Unilever, STMi-
croelectronics, Siemens AG, Benetton Group SpA, SAP AG, BMW
Group, British and French hotel chains, and many other examples in-
dicate that Europe already has companies with a global presence. Pro-
posals to develop European champions are simply an excuse to con-
tinue subsidies to weak companies or to protect local companies from
takeovers that could raise their efficiency, scale, and productivity.
  Narrow, industry-specific regulations that limit competition are common and
should be eliminated. These regulations often have a long-established
history and stay under the radar screen of competition policy. For ex-
ample, German localities regulate the water used in beer production—
in the name of purity and the environment. In reality, this regulation
protects small local brewers from large multinational brewers that
would otherwise take over the market. This is a small industry, but
“trivial” policies like these, when replicated over and over, become an
important barrier to change.
  Administrative procedures and regulations should be reformed to encourage
new business formation and expansion. The Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) has identified a set of regula-
tory barriers that discourage the formation and expansion of new
firms and productivity increases in existing firms (Nicoletti and Scar-
petta 2003). We strongly support their view that the permissions and
paperwork required to operate new businesses or change existing
ones should be streamlined and many restrictive provisions elimi-
nated. The OECD has shown a positive correlation between low regu-
latory barriers of this type and productivity performance. A recent
World Bank/International Monetary Fund study supports the same
idea, showing how entry regulations hamper new firm formation and
slow productivity increase (Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan 2004). 
Open European manufacturing to global competition. There is a mis-
taken view in Europe that the manufacturing sector today is fully com-
petitive, but this is not the case. Eliminating trade barriers within Europe
increased competitive intensity in the 1990s, resulted in a convergence of
prices among European countries, and contributed to improved produc-
tivity. For example, the French auto industry restructured and sharply in-
creased its productivity as it faced full competition with the German in-
dustry. But Europe should go further and eliminate its remaining tariff
and nontariff barriers with the rest of the world.
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demonstrated by three forms of evidence: (1) Industry case studies have
documented the impact of trade barriers on manufacturing productivity
in specific industries (see chapter 2). (2) A study of OECD-wide manufac-
tured-goods prices showed that prices are at least 20 percent higher in
Europe than those that would prevail with fully open trade.8 (3) An In-
stitute for International Economics study by French economist Patrick
Messerlin (2001) documents the existence of widespread tariff and non-
tariff trade barriers in the European Union. For example, why is there a 10
percent tariff on imported automobiles when Europe is a major exporter
in this industry? Messerlin estimates that eliminating existing and identi-
fiable trade barriers in manufacturing, services, and agriculture would
add 6 to 7 percent to EU GDP.
The European Union should act on these findings. At present, both EU
and US trade authorities have become so caught up with jockeying for po-
sition in trade negotiations that they have forgotten that increased open-
ness of their own markets would benefit their economies.
Complete the task of service-sector liberalization and privatization
since it has produced positive results so far. The European Union
made a commitment to privatize state-owned monopolies and open up
Europe-wide competition in services and manufacturing. That policy has
resulted in great successes. The road freight industry is becoming pan-
European and increasing productivity through greater utilization of its
truck fleet and by facilitating long-haul routes throughout Europe. The
mobile phone industry in France was introduced as a private, competitive
industry (in contrast to the fixed-line system under France Telecom), with
sufficient consolidation to allow operation at efficient scale. Labor pro-
ductivity in the French mobile phone industry in 2000 was twice that of
the US industry. The efforts to increase competitive pressure in all service
sectors, and in services of general economic interest9 in particular, must
continue despite arguments that preserving cultural traditions necessi-
tates restrictive policies. 
The financial-services industry is particularly important, not only be-
cause of its size, but also because it plays an important role in allocating
capital. Despite EU efforts to develop a pan-European industry, separate
national banking systems are currently preserved by member-state regu-
lations. Unsurprisingly, comfortable oligopolies are common in this sec-
10 TRANSFORMING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMY
8. See chapter 2 for a discussion of the work by Bradford and Lawrence (2004). Corroborat-
ing evidence for their conclusion that manufactured-goods prices are high in Europe can be
found in the OECD (2001c) study of the new economy. For example, the OECD reports that
computer hardware prices are about 20 percent higher in Europe than in the United States. 
9. This refers to economic services, the provision of which can be considered in the general
economic interest, for example, postal and telephone services.
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son to restrict bank takeovers or prevent the creation of a EU-wide financial-
services industry subject to common eurowide regulation.10 To date, the
cost of establishing new retail branch networks creates a prohibitive bar-
rier to entry in this industry. Therefore, it is important to allow or even fa-
cilitate mergers and acquisitions in order to develop a competitive Euro-
pean banking industry.
The European Union must move rapidly toward the creation of a uni-
fied European standard of professional qualifications. The inability of
professional technical personnel to practice outside their national borders
is a major barrier to service-sector competition overall.
Improve the market for corporate control by eliminating barriers to
mergers and acquisitions. On balance, product-market competition
and labor-market flexibility are the most potent tools to encourage com-
panies to innovate, restructure, and improve their productivity. But an
active market for corporate control can provide a valuable additional
mechanism for increasing competitive intensity. In principle, EU rules en-
courage the development of a market for corporate control, but in practice
many governments have opposed this development and used various tac-
tics to discourage it. German policy is particularly a problem in this area,
notably its pivotal role in blocking the original European Commission
Takeover Directive in its attempt to protect, among others, Volkswagen
from possible takeover. Proposals in France to create national and Euro-
pean champions also suggest limiting takeovers by multinationals from
non-European and even other regional countries.
Policies to Increase Work Incentives and Labor-Market Flexibility
One of the reasons that it is difficult politically to actually implement many
of the policies described above—even though in several cases they have
been among the goals of the European Union for some time—is that re-
structuring and productivity increase will generate layoffs that could tem-
porarily increase unemployment. In this book, we will argue that rapid
productivity growth is good for employment over the long run, but it may
involve employment costs in the short run. It is essential, therefore, that
policies to encourage employment be a priority for European reform.
In fact, labor-market reform has been a priority of ongoing reform ef-
forts, and important positive steps have been taken in several European
economies. Indeed, we argue in chapter 5 that three smaller European
NEW POLICIES AND NEW GOALS FOR CHANGING TIMES 11
10. Anyone familiar with the inefficiencies arising from the still largely state-regulated and
paper check–based US retail banking system will recognize the dangers of maintaining
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ployment through major programs of reform since the 1980s. Our propos-
als for labor-market reform in some instances simply support the steps that
have already been taken. But some of our proposals go beyond any previ-
ous reform plans—at least in the major continental European countries.
The key theme of reform is that the labor market must facilitate and en-
courage change and job mobility while preserving, as far as possible, the
traditional income protections offered in European economies. It is not
easy to combine these two attributes, and important trade-offs have to be
faced. But, we argue, Europe could achieve a much better point on its eq-
uity and efficiency trade-off than the one it is currently on.
Current legal and regulatory barriers to hiring and firing should be
sharply reduced. Companies should be required to provide compensa-
tion for laid-off workers, but only at a moderate and predictable level.
European companies are unable to restructure their companies to remain
competitive because of internal redeployment and layoff restrictions.
Small and large companies alike are reluctant to hire because if the busi-
ness expansion fails they cannot lay off the extra workers they have em-
ployed. In many European economies, layoffs and redeployments are
subject to review by regulatory authorities or by the courts. Restrictive
rules in many EU economies are not consistent with a flexible labor mar-
ket and are not consistent with the need to adapt to the forces driving
markets everywhere.
Companies should be held liable for fair and reasonable separation
payments for workers who have been with the same company for an ex-
tended period of time. However, this compensation should not be large
enough to discourage structural adjustment. Although many economists
have supported the policy described above for some time, policymakers
in France, Germany, and Italy have so far shown little willingness to em-
brace this vital policy change.
The duration of automatic benefits given to the unemployed or non-
employed should be sharply cut back. But these cutbacks should be
combined with programs to facilitate the return to work. It has been
firmly established by economic research that giving unemployment in-
surance (UI) benefits for an indefinite period encourages long-term un-
employment. Several countries in Europe have set or are proposing time
limits on the receipt of UI benefits. For example, such limits are part of
Germany’s Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s Agenda 2010 reform plan, as
well as the recent overhaul of France’s UNEDIC unemployment insur-
ance plan. But it is not enough to simply cut the duration of benefits. Such
a change must be accompanied by one of two additional approaches, or
some combination of the two.
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mented this approach. Labor-market agencies monitor the actions of
the unemployed. Benefit recipients are required to develop action
plans for a return to work, and they are offered retraining for new jobs.
The unemployed are expected to relocate in order to accept a job that
opens up in a different place. They are also required to participate in
work crews that perform fairly menial tasks, such as cleanup, if they
cannot be placed in a regular job. The sanction for not following these
requirements is an immediate loss of benefits. Although very expen-
sive, this program has successfully increased employment in Den-
mark. The Danish model is effective and is part of the European tra-
dition of helping workers find new jobs and ensuring they have the
needed skills—a “third-way” solution. It is rather heavy-handed (as it
needs to be for effectiveness), and it may be difficult to administer in
large, diverse economies.
  Wage insurance.11 Under this plan, workers who lose their jobs would
receive automatic UI benefits for only a short period. But they would
then be offered a wage supplement if they returned to work at a job
that paid a lower wage than their previous job. For example, for two
years, a displaced worker accepts a job paying 30 percent less than his
or her old job; the worker would then receive a wage supplement
equal to 15 percent of the previous wage—enough to close half of the
wage loss. The specific parameters of the program could vary, but the
crucial argument is that it is better to pay people to work than to pay
them to not work. Such a program could also be much cheaper than
the cost of indefinite UI benefits.
  Combine elements of both approaches. A program that offered wage in-
surance combined with access to job placement and training services
could provide the best of both approaches.
The financial incentive to work must be improved. The previous bullet
point described one policy lever to achieve this goal—limiting the duration
of UI benefits. But there are other policies that must be adjusted as well.
  The eligibility and duration of benefits for alternative transfer programs must
be controlled. The Netherlands and Sweden followed policies that were
somewhat similar to those in Denmark, and they also succeeded in
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Robert Litan of the Brookings Institution, have been involved in the development of such a
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Germany has added a small wage insurance plan to its recent labor reform program. This is
an encouraging development, but the plan is very limited at present.
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benefits (see further discussion to follow) as well as sickness and dis-
ability benefits provided alternative financial support for those not
working. Maintaining a humane system for the sick and disabled
while avoiding program abuse or overuse is very difficult. Both the
Netherlands and Sweden have recognized the problem they face and
have tightened eligibility restrictions, but they still face some obsta-
cles. There is a distinct danger that as Germany cuts the duration of its
UI benefits, it will end up with increases in the number of persons on
alternative income-support programs.12 As with changes in the UI
system, welfare reform should be accompanied by measures to help
people get back to work (see next point).
  Work incentives should be increased by cutting tax rates on low- and middle-
wage workers. In many European economies (and in the United States)
low- and middle-wage workers face very high marginal-tax rates13 that
materially affect their decisions to participate in the labor force. Payroll
taxes are generally the biggest problem, and since workers do not pay
the taxes directly it is often and incorrectly assumed that they do not
affect the decision to enter the workforce. In France, Germany, and
Italy the “tax wedge,” reflecting the difference between what employ-
ers pay and what workers receive, is around 50 percent for the median
worker. Marginal-tax rates can be cut by a general reduction in payroll
tax rates (which will necessarily involve cutting the benefits they fi-
nance), or such taxes can be made more progressive (as has been done
in France). Another option is to offer offsetting financial payments to
low-wage workers (negative taxes such as the Working Families Tax
Credit in Britain or the Earned Income Tax Credit in the United States).
Any of these approaches can be effective—and have been effective
when undertaken.
The wage-setting process should be reformed to allow a wider distri-
bution of before-tax wage rates. It is not enough to provide individuals
with incentives to work. There also have to be incentives for employers to
hire. Wages in many European economies are set to benefit the fortunate
“insiders” who have jobs and seniority, while excluding the “outsiders”
who remain unemployed or out of the labor force. Wages are set by
unions whose bargaining power is enhanced by the regulatory and legal
restrictions that reinforce the monopoly power of the incumbent workers
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12. The proposal in the German Agenda 2010 to reorganize the Federal Employment Service
(renamed the Federal Labor Agency) and combine unemployment and social-welfare bene-
fits for eligible unemployed into the new “Basic Income for Job Seekers” (Grundsicherung für
Arbeitsuchende) indicates an attempt to address such concerns. 
13. A high marginal-tax rate means that workers keep only a small fraction of any increase
in income they achieve by taking a job or working longer hours.
01--Ch. 1--1-32  8/23/04  10:06 AM  Page 14and firms. Minimum-wage rates set legally or by agreement are set at
levels that make it difficult to achieve the wider wage distribution that
would facilitate job creation. Union contract wages are often extended to
almost all workers in an industry, reducing the flexibility of the labor mar-
ket. In the past, many employers preferred the labor-market stability that
centralized wage setting brought, but increased competitive pressure ne-
cessitates an increased ability to adapt locally to market developments,
including wages. The insider-outsider structure of the labor market has
been studied for many years, but policymakers in most economies have
not been willing to take on the issue. There are two complementary ap-
proaches that could be followed to reform wage setting.
  The rules that encourage or facilitate nationwide bargaining could be modi-
fied to encourage wages that are set by local considerations. Employers that
are not party to a major contract negotiation should be free to work
out their own deals with their employees and not be constrained by a
national contract. Such a step would introduce much greater competi-
tion to the labor market itself. Minimum-wage rates should be kept at
moderate levels.
  The steps that were described earlier to increase product-market competition
should be implemented. These steps would not only raise productivity, they
would also increase wage and labor-market flexibility. In order to drive
product-market competition down to the labor market, it is essential to
avoid subsidizing companies that are in danger of bankruptcy. Busi-
nesses in Europe argue that they cannot face full global competition,
because they are restricted by wage setting and layoffs. This argument
should be rejected. Rather, force businesses to take on competition, and
they will make the necessary changes on the labor side.
Ideally both of these strategies should be followed. The ability of poli-
cymakers to take on entrenched labor-market institutions depends on the
strength of their political base and their willingness to face at least tem-
porary unpopularity, manifested by public demonstrations and strikes.
Note that an increase in the before-tax wage distribution does not imply
that family incomes must be grossly unequal. A progressive tax system,
combined with social support for health care, will mitigate the effect of
greater wage inequality. Of course there are limits on the extent to which
this can be achieved without eroding incentives, but as we have described
above, some tax provisions can increase equality even as they increase work
incentives—such as wage subsidies, earned income tax credits, or wage
insurance. To reiterate an earlier point, the issue of overall equality in a
society depends not only on the distribution of wages but also on the
availability of jobs. If the wage distribution becomes less equal, but more
people can get jobs, then overall inequality will likely have been reduced
in the society.
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erosion of work incentives. By 2030 it is predicted that there will be one
worker for each retiree in Italy and about 1.3 workers for each retiree in
Germany. Given the pension and healthcare burdens this will involve,
and the taxes needed to finance these burdens, there is a danger that work
incentives will be sharply reduced even from today’s levels.14 There is
wide diversity among European economies as to the severity of their pen-
sion problems, so generalizations are difficult, but two principles apply to
many economies.
  The age for normal retirement should be increased. People are living longer
and that means that, on average, there is an increase in the number of
years during which they could be active participants in the labor mar-
ket. However, rather than extending the period of employment, the
age of retirement has declined in Europe. This trend should be re-
versed by raising the age at which full pension benefits are received.
Access to various early retirement plans, which lowers the effective
age of withdrawal from the labor market, should be restricted to peo-
ple physically unable to continue working. Government-supported
early retirement plans should not be available to the general public
without a significant financial penalty relative to a full pension at the
statutory retirement age.
  Growth in the level of government-provided pension benefits should be re-
duced and fully funded private pension plans encouraged. Using a gradual
process, the real level of state-funded pension payments should be re-
duced. Unless pension levels are controlled in many European coun-
tries they will impose an unfair burden on future taxpayers as the
number of retirees increases.15 It is good policy for government to pro-
vide a minimum level of pension support because many individuals,
especially those with low levels of income and education, will not save
voluntarily for retirement. But beyond that basic level, people should
be expected to save for themselves. Government can facilitate private
pension plans by ensuring that saving vehicles offering good risk and
return combinations are readily available. For much of the postwar pe-
riod, private financial assets held by European savers (mostly in the
form of low-interest savings accounts) earned a negative real rate of
return (McKinsey Global Institute 1994).
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14. The United States faces a similar challenge. Its social security retirement problem is se-
rious but soluble. However, if Medicare costs per enrollee were to continue to rise at the
same rate as in the past 30 years, they would reach 18 percent of GDP by 2050 according to
the Congressional Budget Office. See chapter 2 for a discussion of these issues and sources
of data.
15. Not all European economies face the same challenge. The Netherlands has a solvent
well-funded pension plan.
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new jobs for displaced workers. Strict limits should be placed on subsidized
early retirement programs. We noted earlier that the French auto indus-
try had restructured and raised productivity. The gain to society from
this was limited, however, because many of the displaced workers
were put on early retirement. The Renault plant in Vilvoorde, Belgium
was closed, releasing about 4,000 workers, of which about 1,000 took
early retirement. These workers were as young as 48. Policies to en-
courage reemployment have already been described.
  Continue with the steps already introduced to limit the growth of health costs.
In many ways the European economies are better positioned than the
United States to deal with the exploding healthcare costs of the baby
boom generation because they already work actively to control prices.
In addition, steps have been introduced to increase copayments and
require individuals to bear the cost of nonessential treatments. These
should be continued and extended.
Healthcare payment provisions ought to impact retirement deci-
sions. Individuals, as they decide whether or not to retire, should take
into account the funds they will need to pay their share of healthcare
costs after retirement.
  The cost of health care could be reduced by placing the right economic incen-
tives on providers—doctors and hospitals. One disadvantage of having
heavily regulated and controlled healthcare systems is that healthcare
provider incentives are often not aligned with efficient service provi-
sion.16 For example, doctors and hospitals in Germany have an incen-
tive to keep patients too long. Healthcare providers within individual
countries generally believe that treatment protocols are determined by
best medical practice and not by financial incentives. This is incorrect.
Protocols vary widely by country in ways that reflect economic fac-
tors, so that improving incentives can reduce costs without significant
adverse effects on health outcomes. In fact, sometimes outcomes are
actually improved.17
Pension and healthcare reforms are already part of Europe’s ongoing
reform agenda. Under tremendous budget pressure, many countries have
made cutbacks, and most politicians are aware of the impending prob-
lems from the retiring baby boom generation. Given the unpopularity of
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16. In a more market-oriented system such as the US system, there are different inefficien-
cies, such as heavy administrative costs.
17. Chapter 5 discusses this issue further. Remaining bedridden for an extended period can
slow recovery from illness. In addition, hospitals are dangerous places where infections are
passed among patients. Releasing patients from hospitals sooner could improve their health.
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may be hard to keep the reform effort moving forward in these areas. To
acquiesce to short-term political pressures would be a costly mistake, be-
cause the problems will only get worse with time.
Policies to Improve Macroeconomic Conditions 
Even the most successful program of structural reform in Europe will not
generate growth if the macroeconomic conditions are not right. Weakness
in aggregate demand can ruin any economic party. The SGP, which was
intended to provide a framework for long-term fiscal stability, now seems
to be in shambles. France and Germany have said they will not abide by,
at least, the letter of the SGP rules. The European Council has refrained
from imposing sanctions, and its decision has been upheld by the Euro-
pean Court of Justice. Problems with the SGP suggest that it is in need of
reform, but thus far suggested reforms have been ignored.
The ECB is in one important respect a great success. The euro has been
launched and after falling against the dollar for some time, it has turned
around and is now seen as a solid and established currency. By another
metric, however, the ECB has not done so well. Economic growth in the
euro area has been weak over the past three years, especially in Germany,
its largest economy. The ECB has not moved aggressively enough to stim-
ulate demand, even though inflation has been low, the world economy
was weak, and the euro leveled off and then strengthened. In addition,
the ECB has not adequately explained its goals and actions to the world
at large, resulting in a confused public image. Perhaps this noncommuni-
cation is deliberate given that the bank has clearly violated the goals it
stated when it was set up. 
The discussion of macroeconomic policies is contained in a single chap-
ter in this book—chapter 6—and consists largely of a critique and discus-
sion of the SGP and the ECB. Three policy conclusions about these insti-
tutions are worth presenting here.
  The SGPis in urgent need of reform, and the European Council should
drive the reform process, preferably as part of the ongoing progression
toward a Constitutional Treaty. The European Commission has proposed
reforms, which should be used as the basis for changes in SGP rules. The
SGP’s enforcement mechanisms should also be strengthened by including
progressive penalties for violators, which will signal its commitment to en-
forcement. However, we also recommend greater short-term flexibility in bud-
get targets to accommodate cyclical downturns. 
  Both European and world economic performance would have been
helped by more aggressive ECB countercyclical policies since 2000.
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as both a credible fighter of inflation and defender of the strength of
the euro. Given its success, in the future the ECB can afford to move more
quickly and forcefully to counteract economic weakness in the euro area. We
are confident the ECB will act quickly to counter inflationary pres-
sures if they appear.
  Since the countries joining the euro have given up independent mon-
etary policies, they need alternative forms of adjustment to weather
economic shocks that affect only one or a few of the economies. We
noted above that fiscal policy provides one such adjustment mecha-
nism, but this is not enough. If the price level in one country gets too
high, then there is likely to be prolonged employment and demand
weakness in that country before it brings down its price level relative
to the rest of the euro area. Adjustments in relative price levels within
the euro area would be easier if the overall rate of inflation were not
too low. Either (best option) the ECB should raise its inflation target (cur-
rently less than, but close to, 2 percent), or it should (next best option)
demonstrate its willingness to tolerate above-target inflation for a period of
time to allow member economies to adjust their relative price levels down-
ward as needed.
Lower-Priority or Counterproductive Policies 
There are areas of overlap between the reform proposals given above and
the ideas developed in the Lisbon agenda that emerged from the Euro-
pean Council meeting in 2000. This book offers evidence to support the
implementation of these reforms and suggests variations on and addi-
tions to the Lisbon proposals. Another important issue for reform is pri-
oritization. The Lisbon agenda and subsequent Council statements have
proposed policy reforms to stimulate European economic growth that we
conclude are not high priority and may actually be counterproductive.
  Broader tax reform to lower tax rates on high-income taxpayers is a desirable
goal but not a top priority for Europe. If undertaken, however, it should
be based on improving incentives rather than providing political pay-
offs to supporters. In general, we did not find that high taxes on the
rich were a key barrier to economic or employment growth in Europe.
Britain has a relatively low tax rate on high incomes, but it is the coun-
try that suffers the most from a shortage of skillful managerial and
technical personnel—except in the financial sector—among the major
European economies.
In most countries it is possible to undertake revenue-neutral tax re-
form that eliminates shelters, exemptions, and loopholes in addition
to lowering tax rates for all taxpayers. This is the standard approach
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several countries have adopted such measures—the United States in
1986, for example. This type of tax reform would benefit Europe as
long as it does not become the centerpiece of policy and distract from
overall reform efforts. Beyond revenue-neutral changes, cutting the
very high tax rates levied on upper-income taxpayers may become
possible in Europe provided stronger growth materializes, transfer
payments or other forms of government spending are reduced, and
revenue constraints are eased.
The issue of tax harmonization among EU member states is fre-
quently brought forward as a required remedy against “beggar-thy-
neighbor” tax policies. In theory, some countries could offer very low
tax rates and very low levels of social services to the poor. This would
encourage wealthy individuals to move into their country and encour-
age poor people to move out and be supported by taxpayers in other
countries. This danger does not seem a major one, however, as eco-
nomic migration remains limited within Europe. The greater danger 
is that tax harmonization will force every country to move its tax rates
to the very high levels of some of the economies, which would be
counterproductive. Based on the starting point in most European
economies, some tax competition would be a positive move.18
  Large-scale infrastructure spending is not the way to stimulate economic
growth in Europe. Infrastructure investment seems to be needed in sev-
eral of the less developed economies of the European Union, includ-
ing the Eastern European economies, and also Britain, which has ne-
glected its infrastructure. However, none of the industry case studies
(even in Britain) found that a lack of infrastructure was a significant
barrier to best-practice performance. Increases in government spend-
ing—with corresponding tax increases—would likely have adverse ef-
fects on private-sector employment and investment. Additional stim-
ulus to aggregate demand in Europe, as needed, should be provided
by monetary policy or tax cuts.
  There is no good case for rapid increases in overall government spending on
education and training. As in the case of infrastructure, with the excep-
tion of some less developed economies and of Britain, we did not find
the weakness of labor skills to be a barrier to economic growth in Eu-
rope. In general, skills in Europe for the bulk of the labor force are as
good as or better than in any other economic region. More than likely
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panies by local governments to lure investment into the area. Frequently, the size of such of-
fers is dictated by political considerations rather than the potential gains from a given proj-
ect to the local area. For examples of excessive use of incentives to lure investment, see
McKinsey Global Institute (2003).
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are allocated and managed for all educational levels, although that is
not a focus of this book.
  Major government spending programs intended to encourage greater use of
information technology (IT) are not needed. While we did find that Europe
lagged the United States in IT use, the gap was smaller than had been
thought at the 2000 Lisbon meeting. Moreover, the collapse of IT
spending in the United States since 2000 has signaled the dangers of
overinvestment in the sector. There may be facilitating policies that
would increase access to communications and computer technologies.
But in general, regulations and lack of competitive pressure are the
main obstacles to greater use of and benefits from IT in the business
sector. Another barrier to IT use is its high equipment cost, which is
yet another example of the broader problem of high manufacturing
prices noted earlier.
Summarizing the Nature of the Reform Proposals
The reforms proposed in this book are designed to increase flexibility and
improve economic incentives—incentives for individuals to work and in-
centives for companies to operate productively, expand business, and cre-
ate jobs. Improving incentives for companies generally means increasing
the level of competitive intensity they face.
Striking the right balance of incentives for the business sector not only
involves encouraging competition, it also involves allowing companies
and industries to evolve as technologies and tastes change. It is detrimen-
tal to protect a fragmented industry where most of the participants are
below minimum efficient scale and are not using the most productive
business practices. It is also bad policy to offer subsidized loans to favored
companies to keep them operational. As far as possible, competition
should be played out on a level playing field where new companies are al-
lowed or encouraged and where both old and new companies are allowed
to fail.
Getting the incentives right, however, means recognizing that not all in-
dustries are alike. In fact, in some industries it may be difficult or impos-
sible to rely solely on market competition. There are a few industries (or
subindustries) where there are natural monopolies, and there are sectors
where there is a danger that an unregulated market will create monopo-
lies. Finding the right degree of regulation, and finding the best way to reg-
ulate, therefore, present two of the most important challenges facing any
modern economy. But it can be done. It is possible to regulate monopolies
in ways that create strong performance incentives. For example, produc-
tivity growth in Britain’s electricity distribution system has been rapid
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sure on prices. Productivity growth in the US telecom industry was also
rapid when AT&T had a virtual monopoly. This was not because of the
monopoly, it was because the opportunities for productivity increase were
large and the regulatory system in place provided an incentive to AT&T to
take advantage of those opportunities. In other cases the existence of an-
titrust policy can be helpful by discouraging predatory practices.19
Germany and other European economies can overregulate the market
(as Japan does) in a way that limits competition and slows change. If Eu-
ropean policymakers are serious about reform, they will have to risk hurt-
ing established companies and workers as well as possibly making struc-
tural unemployment worse in the short run in order to achieve long-term
growth. With the right set of macroeconomic and reform policies that risk
can be minimized.
If striking the right balance of incentives for individuals were based on
a very narrow concept of market efficiency, then people would have to
face the full economic consequences of their actions. In many European
countries, where people can collect substantial unemployment benefits or
welfare payments indefinitely and retirement benefits are largely unre-
lated to private savings, the link between income and individual respon-
sibility has been severely undermined. The right incentives mean that
people are given emergency assistance and covered by insurance against
catastrophic loss or injury. The existence of such social protections im-
proves the welfare—improves the market outcome—of everyone in the
society in the face of economic uncertainties. But having the right incen-
tives also means that people should face a significant economic penalty
when they choose not to work, and they should shoulder some responsi-
bility for protecting themselves against economic setbacks through pri-
vate savings. 
Finding the right trade-off between equity and efficiency is indeed very
difficult. However, many European countries have gone too far in the pro-
vision of social insurance. This book explores the possibility that if work
incentives are too low, an unstable decline in employment could occur.
Benefit levels paid to those who are not working are financed primarily
by taxes on those who do work. If the benefits are too generous or are pro-
vided for too large a segment of the population, then the number of will-
ing workers will decline over time. This will raise the tax burden on those
still working and reduce even more the incentive to work. The possibility
of such a downward spiral of work effort may help explain the 1970s and
1980s in Europe, but more important is the concern about the future. With
the number of retirees rising rapidly and the number of persons of work-
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specific antitrust actions have actually been helpful.
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work incentives could erode much more and threaten a gradual collapse
of the labor market.
Choosing How Many Hours to Work
There is general consensus that it would be helpful to create greater em-
ployment opportunities and thereby reduce unemployment and increase
labor force participation. A more controversial idea is that full-time em-
ployees should work more hours—either longer hours per week or fewer
weeks of vacation. There has been a decline in hours worked per year by
full-time employees in Europe, and this can be interpreted as purely a vol-
untary choice.
We do not believe, however, that Europeans are freely choosing the
number of hours they work in a year based on the right economic incen-
tives. First, heavy taxes and high benefit and transfer payments affect in-
dividual choices. In particular, health and retirement benefits are not
closely linked to income, while the tax burden on additional income is
very high—conditions that will incline individuals to work fewer hours.
For example, if the government supports college students by using tax
revenues, parents of those students have no incentive to work extra hours
to pay for tuition. It is not clear that such choices are optimal (or even
egalitarian when low- and middle-income workers are taxed to support
students from wealthy families).
Second, the number of hours per week and number of weeks per year
are generally not determined on an individual basis. Instead, they are ne-
gotiated in collective agreements or dictated by policy. It is unlikely that
such collective or policy decisions are made in a way that yields the best
outcome for the economy overall. Policymakers mistakenly believe that
shortening the number of hours per worker will raise total employment.
Individuals often mistakenly assume that they can work fewer hours with
no loss of real income—shorter hours are presented to them as costless so
why not vote in favor of a policy to cut work hours.
Third, life expectancy is steadily increasing. If faced with the true eco-
nomic consequences of this increase in longevity, individuals would likely
combine higher savings with an increase in the number of hours worked.
So far, Europeans have not reacted this way. Rather, earlier retirement,
lower labor force participation, and lower hours worked per year have
been the norm. If individuals were to face the right incentives, we judge
they would likely change all three dimensions of their work choices, in-
cluding choosing somewhat longer hours worked per year.
Fourth, as recently as 1973 workers in the large European economies
worked nearly as many hours per year as those in other developed econo-
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they were working 300–400 fewer hours.20 This suggests that differences in
economic conditions and policies may have induced the divergence in out-
comes, rather than a sudden shift in deep-seated European preferences.
We are certainly not recommending policies that will force people to
work longer hours per week or per year. But we do recommend that peo-
ple be given the option of working longer hours. We oppose mandating
shorter hours for everyone, whether through policy or collective agree-
ments. In addition, we believe that policies that distort incentives in ways
that shorten work hours, relative to optimal individual choices, impose
significant costs that should be weighed against their benefits.
The Literature 
There is an extensive library of literature dating back over 20 years advo-
cating European economic reform, and many of the themes presented in
this book exist in this earlier literature. The 1980s literature on “Euroscle-
rosis” and the barriers to European growth presented many of the rele-
vant issues for reform.21 However, there is substantive new material in
this book that goes beyond prior literature. It is based on our own analy-
sis as well as on a range of studies since the 1980s. We have tried to pre-
sent a comprehensive analysis of the economic issues facing Europe,
building on facts and supported by aggregate, economywide data and de-
tailed case studies of individual industries.22
There have been major developments in productivity in recent years
with faster growth evident in the United States and a few other countries.
Most of Europe, however, seems to have missed the revival of productiv-
ity. Understanding what drives productivity improvement—including
the role of IT—is an important task and an important element in any re-
forms intended to increase long-run growth in Europe. This book tries to
avoid economic jargon and clearly present the forces that have shaped the
European economy, the principles that should support structural reform,
and the priorities for reform.23 This is an ideal time to discuss reforms, be-
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20. Data from Groningen Growth and Development Centre and The Conference Board, To-
tal Economy Database, February 2004. www.ggdc.net.
21. For a leading example see Lawrence and Schultze (1987), which also contains many
additional references.
22. Most of the industry-level analysis comes from work by the McKinsey Global Institute.
Martin Baily is a senior adviser to McKinsey & Company and participated in most of the
studies described below.
23. The findings of the Sapir report (2003) contributed to our analysis and are complemen-
tary to this effort. A recent study by Bayoumi, Laxton, and Pesenti (2003) strongly supports
the benefits of competition in improving economic performance. Olivier Blanchard (2004)
takes a relatively optimistic view of the situation in Europe, arguing that reforms already in
01--Ch. 1--1-32  8/23/04  10:06 AM  Page 24cause European policymakers are being forced by the facts to face the
need for reform. And based on their public statements, they are commit-
ted to developing far-reaching reform programs.
Feasibility of Reform Proposals
This analysis presents the reforms we believe Europe should follow to be-
come more competitive and expand employment. It is an economic analy-
sis rather than a political analysis. If this economic analysis is to be rele-
vant and helpful to the policy debate in Europe, there should be some
relation between what is proposed here and what is feasible.
There is a relationship: The policies designed to increase productivity
involve expanding trade and competition within Europe and increasing
global competition. They involve continued liberalization of sectors pre-
viously dominated by state-owned enterprises and the restructuring of in-
dustries that have been overprotected. Although these reforms have been
part of the policy thrust of the European Union for many years, progress
has been limited. Despite setbacks and obstacles, we urge policymakers to
keep moving ahead with reform instead of staying motionless or even
turning back.
Reform efforts in France and Germany are currently seen as politically
unpopular given the losses in French and German regional elections.24
Transforming the European economy will require committed political
leaders. Governments in most European countries today enjoy strong
parliamentary mandates with time to enact required reforms before a
new election cycle. Policymakers should seize this opportunity and not
be deterred by the results of regional or local elections or by the actions
of protesters.
To be successful, policymakers must “sell” a reform program to the elec-
torate. French and German leaders suffered election setbacks because nei-
ther articulated a clear and honest picture of what must be accomplished
by reform, the reasons for change, the likely short-term effects, and the
large long-run societal payoff. Instead, voters, already discontented by
cyclical weakness in their economies, were simply presented with cut-
backs in entitlement programs—such as pensions and unemployment in-
surance—that they believed were safe. The struggle to achieve economic
reform will be tough, regardless, but without a clear picture of what is at
stake, there is little hope of success.
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ing perspective on reform, also see Baldassarri and Busato (2003). Sinn (2003) looks particu-
larly at Germany’s economic ills and proposes solutions not unlike those in this book.
24. In France, President Chirac’s party, the UMP, suffered losses. Similarly, in Germany,
Chancellor Schröder’s party, the SDP, lost in regional elections. Voters are reportedly op-
posed to the economic reforms these leaders have proposed or enacted. 
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crease productivity. Incumbents are very involved in maintaining control
over land use to protect their position and in retaining other narrow in-
dustry-specific regulations that protect them. However, evidence provided
in this book demonstrates that when competition is permitted, economies
benefit with higher productivity. The evidence to support the productivity-
enhancing policies outlined here can be found within Europe as well as
from US experience. European policymakers should build on their own
success stories.
The same argument also applies to labor-market and social policy re-
forms. No country has chosen its labor-market and social insurance poli-
cies optimally, but an important lesson can be drawn from Denmark, the
Netherlands, and Sweden. If major policy reforms are undertaken to in-
crease employment incentives, employment will increase. European poli-
cymakers can, therefore, build on Europe’s own success stories in this area.
If implemented, the proposed labor-market reforms would represent a
significant shift in European policy, since they seek to preserve adequate
income protection for displaced workers and include tax reforms to in-
crease the after-tax incomes of low-wage workers. Although these are
both market- and incentive-oriented reforms, they also recognize the goal
of social cohesion. The dismantling of social welfare is not required.
We have argued that the policy proposals in the book are not modeled
on US policies, and we acknowledge that that US policies are far from per-
fect. To the best of our ability, the analysis in this book is based on eco-
nomic principles. That said, the US economy has been extraordinarily suc-
cessful at job creation over the long run, and productivity growth has
been strong since the mid-1990s. The US economy is market oriented and
provides strong incentives for individuals to work and for companies to
be productive. Therefore, it would be foolish, for us as economists or for
policymakers in Europe, to ignore the lessons from the US experience if
they can help Europe achieve its goals. 
On the feasibility of policy reform and its implementation, we would
like to draw attention to the forthcoming book on Germany by our Insti-
tute colleague Adam Posen.While Posen presents his own perspective on
reform priorities, his study of German policy and reform will be very
complementary to this analysis.
Chapter Summaries
Chapter summaries are included as a guide to the structure of the book.
As chapters 2 through 7 are summarized, there is some inevitable repeti-
tion of the themes developed in this first chapter.
Chapter 2 examines Europe’s postwar success and subsequent prob-
lems. It seeks to answer the key question: If the European economic sys-
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long? Our answer is that European economic institutions were sufficiently
suited to the period of catch-up growth after World War II but are too
rigid to succeed or adapt in the current market where flexibility is more
important. The European economy had great difficulty adjusting to the ef-
fect of declining productivity growth that started in the 1970s, and to the
impact of trade and technology on the demand for low-skill workers.
Over most of the postwar period, GDP per hour worked has grown
faster in Europe than in the United States. This period of rapid growth
shows the tremendous productivity success Europe achieved as it caught
up to the US level (Britain is an exception to this statement). However,
when productivity slowed this created serious economic difficulties. Not
only does such a growth slowdown cause persistent unemployment, it re-
duces tax revenue growth and thus can lead to budget problems. It low-
ers real wage growth and weakens profits. It makes it much more difficult
to finance the retirement income of pensioners. If Europe could increase
its rate of productivity growth, this would ease its transition to a full em-
ployment economy and make it much easier to avoid any threat of an un-
stable employment decline. 
Chapter 3 considers how Europe could improve its rate of productivity
growth. The key is to increase the intensity of competition in product mar-
kets, encourage business and industry restructuring, and adopt regula-
tory reform to facilitate these. The chapter examines the literature, in-
cluding a recently completed OECD study (OECD 2003f) of economic
growth, and reviews the policy implications of it. In particular, the study
found that international competition and globalization spur growth. An-
other powerful empirical finding is that new start-up companies in the
United States are very different from those in Europe. Their employment
levels have increased much more. The ability of US companies to experi-
ment in the market is seen as possibly an important reason for stronger
job creation in America, while start-up growth in Europe may be ham-
pered by strict employment protection legislation often covering all but
the smallest European firms.
Since the issue of IT has been so important to the growth debate, the
chapter also explores the role of IT in US and European growth. Looking
at comparable business operations across the two regions shows IT use is
often quite similar for both. When IT is not used as effectively in Europe
as in the United States it is mostly because of the industry structure or
other barriers to innovation, rather than because of an intrinsic inability to
install IT. IT is one means to achieve faster growth in Europe and does
provide an opportunity that Europe should exploit given how it can im-
prove business. But technology policies are often overrated and should
not be used as an excuse to avoid more fundamental structural reform.
Europe can draw important lessons from the revival of US productivity
growth. The US productivity revival took place in an environment of very
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international sources. Therefore, to take advantage of the potential for
productivity growth it is essential to allow economic change to take place
and for the competitive process to work its way out.
Two major studies carried out by the McKinsey Global Institute used
industry case studies and looked at the levels and growth rates of pro-
ductivity in France and Germany in the 1990s. These studies determined
that the nature of regulation in industries had a major effect on their per-
formance. The industries where competition is encouraged generally
achieve the best productivity performance. A good-news story for Europe is
that many of the regulatory reforms undertaken so far are working.
Chapter 4 focuses on Britain. According to the OECD, Britain today has
flexibility in both product and labor markets. If our diagnosis of Europe’s
problems and solutions in chapters 2 and 3 is correct, Britain should have
been performing better economically recently than major continental Eu-
ropean economies.
Although in some respects Britain has done better than other large Eu-
ropean economies over the past few years, its economy continues to suf-
fer from a low level of productivity relative to both other major European
countries and the United States.
A review of the literature on British productivity leads us to conclude
that some special factors are at play in the British economy. In addition,
the particular implementation of privatization and deregulation insti-
tuted under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (and others) in the 1980s
and the early 1990s did not immediately succeed in creating truly com-
petitive markets—the British electricity generation market is a notorious
example—and this postponed potential productivity gains. Further, Brit-
ain suffers from a relatively low-skilled workforce compared to other Eu-
ropean countries, while also not possessing the large cohort of educated
managers found in the United States. 
Thus there are a variety of factors contributing to continued low rela-
tive productivity in Britain. We are optimistic that faster productivity
growth will occur in that economy as the benefits of past reforms play
out.25 But we see a need for continued efforts to make product markets
truly competitive across the board.
Chapter 5 turns to the issue of social policy reform. The first half of the
chapter focuses on some guiding principles that such reforms should fol-
low. These include setting time limits on unemployment insurance bene-
fits and welfare; introducing wage insurance as a substitute for current
unemployment insurance; ensuring that disability programs do not be-
come the final inactive parking lot of a large share of the population;
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gradually over time to a system where pension levels are tied to private
saving, beyond a minimum payment; making sure that the minimum in-
come support level provides an adequate incentive to work; and tax re-
bates or negative taxes to improve the income of the working poor. 
The second half of chapter 5 looks in detail at the social system, labor
market, and tax reforms implemented in three small European coun-
tries—the Netherlands, Sweden, and Denmark—in the last 20 years.
These three countries already have implemented national social reforms
that embody many of the guiding principles laid out in the first half of 
the chapter, and have supplemented these with extensive active labor-
market programs, such as worker training. The experiences of the Nether-
lands, Sweden, and Denmark should therefore provide important exam-
ples for other European countries that social reforms are possible and do
work in a European political environment. None of the three dismantled
its programs of social insurance. Instead each found ways within its dis-
parate national institutions to improve the incentives to work and en-
hance economic performance.
Yet, chapter 5 also highlights the pitfalls of social policy reforms; how
the Netherlands today may have a very low unemployment rate, but on
the other hand has far more disabled people than almost any other coun-
try; how Sweden’s employee absentee rate from sickness seems unrea-
sonably high and strongly related to the generosity of sickness benefits;
and how Denmark faces a huge bill for its active labor-market pro-
grams—a cost that does not seem to fall much even when unemployment
is low. The examples of the three small European economies show the
dangers of piecemeal reform of individual parts of a welfare state. The ap-
pendix to chapter 5 lays out the positive effects of social reforms on the
significant unobserved economy in Europe.
Chapter 6 examines macroeconomic policies to support growth and re-
form. As noted earlier, reforms that increase work incentives will not
work if there are no jobs available because of a cyclical contraction. The
chapter evaluates the SGP and the performance of the ECB. The SGP con-
tains the ingredients for a good deal of mischief. Given that Europe and
the rest of the world are only now coming gradually out of a downturn,
forcing fiscal contraction on Europe is a bad idea. It requires that EU coun-
tries maintain budget deficits below 3 percent of GDP and imposes fines
if that target is missed. In practice the SGP has not been politically en-
forceable and so, as it stands, the SGP is ineffective at its original and de-
sirable goal of requiring reasonable fiscal discipline of all EU member
countries. But more fortunately, it also fails in its unintended impact of
forcing a fiscal policy on the region at a time when such a policy could ex-
acerbate the business cycle.
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European Commission has critiqued these and offered its own reforms. We
support the Commission’s proposals with some important modifications. 
The chapter then turns to monetary policy and the ECB. In practice the
ECB has not kept inflation below its target and has even eased policy at a
time when inflation was higher than this. Also, it did not keep money
supply growth close to the target level. The ECB in practice has responded
to real variables and not just to inflation or money supply growth.
While no one wants to go back to the days of excessive inflation, the
world economy does seem to have changed and we have discovered the
perils of inflation rates that are either too low or too high. Prices at, and
possibly near, deflationary levels create or exacerbate economic problems.
The countries that have entered the euro have sacrificed their ability to
make independent monetary policy and use the flexibility of exchange
rates to respond to country-level economic shocks—adjustments that
would have changed the equilibrium exchange rate prior to the euro. Fis-
cal policy has limited power to offset this problem and Europe has low
labor mobility so that migration provides only modest relief. The adjust-
ment of national price and wage levels will have to substitute for the ad-
justment of exchange rates. This will be much easier to do if it does not re-
quire substantial downward adjustments of nominal wages and prices.
The ECB should recognize the benefits of modest positive rates of inflation.
Chapter 7 looks at the reform efforts now under way to increase com-
petitive intensity in Europe and make labor markets more flexible. The
chapter starts with a description and assessment of competition policy at
the EU level. The Commission has responsibility only for companies en-
gaged in cross-border activities, leaving the regulation of many service in-
dustries, and even much of manufacturing, still at the national level.
Moreover, the Commission does not control many of the regulations that
affect competition in practice, such as land use. The conclusion, therefore,
is that although there is considerable value in having an EU competition
policy, the broad reform agenda in Europe—encompassing social policies
and product-market regulations—must be carried out at the national or
member-state level. That is where the power resides that can bring about
the required change.
Throughout the book there has been discussion of what reform policies
should be followed and the extent to which the large economies are 
on track to carry them out. A summary of recommendations for Britain,
France, Germany, and Italy is provided in chapter 7. 
The chapter concludes with a discussion of whether reform should be
undertaken in one big push or incrementally. The economic case for a big
push on reform is clear. Restructuring companies to raise productivity
does not improve overall economic performance if alternative jobs are not
available, or if workers have no incentive to accept them. 
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It is clear that progress has been made, but much more is needed. Euro-
pean reforms are not being implemented at the rate that is needed to
achieve the Lisbon goals—in fact, the intermediate Lisbon 2005 targets in
the area of employment will be missed (European Commission 2004a, 4).
Figure 1.1 shows that only in a single year at the peak of the boom in 2000
did the European Union in the past achieve the pace of employment
growth that will be required to reach the 2010 goals—namely, 21.5 million
additional jobs. But the question remains: Is the reform process on the
right track? With some qualifications, the answer is yes. There are now ex-
amples of countries within Europe that have instituted social policy re-
forms and have seen employment rise and productivity increase in re-
sponse. But there remains much more to do despite the signs of backlash
against reform. If this book contributes in any way to sustaining the for-
ward movement of economic reform in Europe, it will have accomplished
its purpose. 
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Figure 1.1   EU-15 employment growth 1992–2003 and 2010 Libson
goals, annual change
thousands of new jobs
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